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Published Articles of Jeff DiCello
10 Practically Painless Ways to Brush Up on
Your Area of Law


Published in the Redwood Association of Paralegals Quarterly Newsletter, the REAP Record, Summer 2008.

In today’s busy world a working legal professional does not always have time to brush up on, or keep up with the latest legal developments. Below, organized by topic, are ten almost painless ways to keep up with the latest developments in various areas of law without leaving your home, office or car. The sources include printed material, web-based materials and TV and radio programs.

  1. Real Property
    Benny Kass’ Real Estate Mailbag column. Each week in the Open Homes section of the San Francisco Chronicle, Kass, an attorney in Washington, D.C., and Maryland answers questions sent in by readers concerning real property law . Here’s a link to Benny’s column archives.

  2. Landlord Tenant
    This is a two-for-one deal. The aforementioned S.F. Chronicle has two good resources concerning landlord-tenant law.
    One is the Rental Roundtable column edited by Robert Griswold, a property manager and radio host. Each week in the real estate section of the Chronicle, questions submitted by landlords and tenants are answered by both a landlord’s attorney and a tenants’ attorney. It is interesting to see how the answer to the questions can vary depending on the point of view of the attorney answering. Here’s a link to the column archives on the Chronicle website. Here’s a link to an archive of Rental Roundtable columns from Mr. Griswold’s website.
    The second landlord-tenant resource is the Rent Watch column in the Home section of the Saturday edition of the Chronicle. It too follows a Q & A format to answer common landlord-tenant questions.

  3. Calif. Appellate Court Decisions
    Despite appearances, I am not on the Chronicle payroll, but here again is another resource from that periodical: any article written by reporter Bob Egelko. Egelko, who is also an attorney, covers legal affairs for the Chronicle. His articles often explain recent California appellate and supreme court decisions dealing with criminal law and general civil litigation.

  4. Wills, Trusts and Estates & General Law
    Len Tillem is a Sonoma attorney who specializes in wills, trusts and estates. Using his trademark New Yorker cynicism, Tillem takes calls from listeners on a myriad of legal topics on his two programs on KGO radio (810 AM). His programs air on KGO 810 AM Mon. – Fri. from 12 noon to 1:00 pm, and on Sundays from 4 to 7 pm.

  5. General Law (Small Claims, Torts, Contracts, Landlord-Tenant)
    OK, I know I am going to get a lot of flak for this one, but despite my fondness for TV judge Marilyn Milian, billed by her own show The People’s Court, as the “hottest judge on television, I sincerely believe that if your goal is to brush up on a little law, Judge M’s show gives you the best bang for the buck.

    What makes Judge Milian good is that she takes the time to explain the legal concepts in the cases she presides over. Her program airs locally on the CBS affiliate, KPIX (Channel 5 on most cable systems) weekdays from 3 to 4 p.m.

  6. Plaintiff’s Personal Injury/Medical Malpractice, etc.
    Plaintiff magazine, which debuted last summer, is a free publication, supported solely by advertisers, geared towards plaintiff’s attorneys in Northern California. The monthly magazine covers issues, such as personal injury, medical malpractice and employment law from a plaintiff’s perspective. Paralegals and attorneys can subscribe for free. To subscribe, contact Jean Hutchins at subscriptions@plaintiffmagazine.com or by phone at 760-721-2500. Even the advertisements are a valuable source of information for such things as expert witnesses, legal software, etc.

  7. Personal Injury/Insurance Issues
    California Personal Injury and Insurance Blog, operated by Elk Grove attorney Jonathen G. Stein, is full of “information and insights for consumers regarding personal injury law, insurance, and the tort system.”

  8. DUI Law
    Attorney Lawrence Taylor, widely regarded as an expert in DUI law, operates the DUI Blog. Taylor’s tag line for his blog reads “Bad Drunk Driving Laws, False Evidence and a Fading Constitution.” Granted, this is not everyone’s cup of tea, but Taylor makes compelling arguments that DUI laws have become draconian and have lead to the erosion of significant rights.

  9. Calif. Appellate Decisions
    In the California Appellate Report, U.C. San Diego Law School professor Shaun Martin muses on recent Ninth Circuit and California appellate cases. In addition to his insightful, humorous comments, Prof. Martin provides links to the slip opinions of each of the cases he comments on.

  10. Everything But The Kitchen Sink
    If you can learn to separate the kooks from those who know what they are talking about, the Craigslist Legal Forum can be a valuable resource to learn a little law or discuss legal issues. Anyone can read the forum but to post you have to register. You can post using an anonymous “handle.” There are several regular posters to this forum who are attorneys or paralegals.

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Paralegal Fee Recovery: History and Application


Published in the California Alliance of Paralegal Associations (CAPA) newsletter, Spring 2009

INTRODUCTION

Not too long ago, in the U.S., the notion that paralegal fees could be included in attorney’s fees awards was considered pure folly. However, in the past two decades, the landscape has shifted, and in many jurisdictions, paralegal fees are routinely awarded along with attorney’s fees. This article traces the evolution of attorney and paralegal fee recovery, and offers some practical guidelines for paralegals to assist in preparing a successful paralegal fees award petition.

But before we can get to paralegal fee recovery, some background concerning the history of the concept of fee awards is in order.

HISTORY OF LEGAL FEE RECOVERY

In England, the land that inspired our legal system, up until the 13th century, no person was entitled to recover any costs of suit. In 1394, the Lord Chancellor, the official then responsible for the efficient functioning and independence of the courts in England, was given the power to award damages if the allegations by a plaintiff were unfounded.

In the early 1600s, England then extended the right of defendants to recover costs through various statutes which provided that defendants were in general allowed to recover costs. A 1797 English case, Tyte v Globe, established that costs could be recovered by a successful claimant, even though there was no express provision to that effect in a statute.

Later, in the early 19th Century, a legal reform movement began in England to allow a successful litigant to recover his full costs from his opponent. As a result, a series of Acts of Parliament led to laws allowing prevailing parties to collect costs from their vanquished opponents.

Today, attorney’s fees awards are a fact of life in England, Canada and many of the nations of Europe.

THE AMERICAN RULE

By contrast, in the U.S., such awards are the exception, rather than the rule. Generally, here, under the so-called “American rule,” each party in a lawsuit bears his own costs and fees, unless a statute or contractual provision provides otherwise.

The reason for this distinction has been summed up thusly:

“In support of the American rule, it has been argued that since litigation is at best uncertain one should not be penalized for merely defending or prosecuting a lawsuit, and that the poor might be unjustly discouraged from instituting actions to vindicate their rights if the penalty for losing included the fees of their opponents' counsel.”

Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co. (1967) 386 U.S. 714, 718.

It appears that the origin of the “American Rule” can be traced to Arcambel v. Wiseman (1796) 3 U.S. 3 Dall. 306, a case in which a lower court had awarded $1,600 in attorney’s fees.

In that case the high court said of the practice of awarding such fees:

We do not think that this charge ought to be allowed. The general practice of the United States is in opposition to it, and even if that practice were not strictly correct in principle, it is entitled to the respect of the Court, till it is changed or modified, by statute.

This rule was confirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Society (1975) 421 U.S. 240.

But, gradually, a number of statutes have been implemented that allowed for the awarding of attorney’s fees in certain types of cases. At the federal level, for example, there is the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976 (42 U.S.C. §1988), which allowed courts to award reasonable attorney’s fees to the prevailing party in litigation brought to enforce private civil rights and the Equal Access to Justice Act (5 U.S.C. §504.)

Attorney’s fees are also generally allowed at the federal level for class actions, actions involving violations of the Freedom of Information Act, copyright and patent cases, antitrust actions, lemon law cases, and suits against the federal government where the position of the government was not “substantially justified.”

PARALEGAL FEE RECOVERY

However, whether paralegal fees were considered part of attorney’s fees varied from state to state. For example, as early as 1986, Arizona found paralegal services to be compensable in attorney’s fee awards. (Continental Townhouses East Unit One Association v. Brockbank (1986) 152 Ariz. 537, 544 [733 P.2d 1120, 1127.) In other states, courts have not objected to the concept of awarding paralegal fees, but they have noted that laws as currently written do not allow for such awards. (See Hines v. Hines (1997) 129 Idaho 847 [934 P.2d 20.]; and F.D.I.C. v. Singh (D. Me. 1993) 148 F.R.D. 6.)

The seminal national case establishing that paralegal fees were recoverable as part of attorney’s fees was Missouri v. Jenkins (1989) 491 U.S. 274, a case dealing with fee awards under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976 (42 U.S.C. 1988.) The high court stated that this statute “cannot… have been meant to compensate only work performed personally by members of the bar,” and that attorney fees must take into account the work not only of attorneys, but also the work of paralegals. Not only that, but the court held that a reasonable attorney's fee under a §1988 action is one calculated on the basis of prevailing market rates, which can be above the actual salary paid to the paralegal.

Jenkins was an important case for the paralegal profession because had the ruling gone the other way, the effect would surely have been such that attorneys would have had little incentive to use paralegals. The decision made it easier for courts in other states to reach the conclusion that their state’s attorney’s fees statutes were intended to include paralegal fees. The case also cleared up a lot of confusion in the courts below where contrary decisions had held that paralegal fees could not be considered a part of attorney’s fees. Since then, thousands of cases dealing with the award of paralegal fees have been decided in state and federal courts across the U.S.

In the wake of Missouri v. Jenkins, several states have enacted statutes that include paralegal fees as part of attorney’s fee awards. As of 2004, Alaska, California, Florida, New Jersey, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, New York, Oklahoma and Ohio were among the states where statutes or court rules permitted the award of paralegal fees.

In a line of federal cases, paralegal fees were denied because the paralegal did not meet the educational requirements of Bus. & Prof. Code, sec. 6450. See Sanford v. GRMI, Inc. dba Red Lobster, 04-1535 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 11, 2005), White v. GMRI, Inc. dba Red Lobster, 04-0620 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 2006) and Martinez v. G. Maroni Co., dba Church's Chicken #948, S06-1399 (E.D. Cal. May 1, 2007. Implicit in these cases is the notion that, in attorney's fees cases, paralegal fee recovery is permissible as part of those fees.

In June of 2008, the U.S. Supreme Court issued another important decision dealing with paralegal fee recovery that further solidified the concept of paralegal fee recovery first discussed by the high court in Missouri v. Jenkin, supra. In Richlin Security Service Co. v. Chertoff (2008) 553 U.S. ___; 128 S. Ct. ___; 170 L. Ed. 2d 960.), the court held that in cases litigated against the government under the Equal Access to Justice Act, a prevailing party may recover paralegal fees from the government at prevailing market rates. Both Jenkins and Richlin also make it clear that paralegal fees can be awarded at market rates, which is the marked up rate charged to the client, rather than at the rate that the paralegal earns from his or her employer.

California courts have also gotten on board the paralegal fee recovery bandwagon. In Guinn v. Dotson (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 262, a case involving an action by property owners against a civil engineer, a city, and contractors, the trial court, in awarding attorney fees to the engineer erred in failing to include reasonable fees for paralegals employed by the engineer's attorneys.

The appellate court said that an award of attorney fees that did not compensate for paralegal service time would not fully compensate the attorney. Therefore, “attorney fees” as used in Code Civ. Proc., § 411.35(h), would include as a compensable element reasonable paralegal fees billed to the engineer.

Several federal statutes providing for the award of attorney’s fees have been amended to provide for the award of paralegal fees. These include federal bankruptcy laws, the Employee Retirement Act of 1974, the Sherman Antitrust Act and the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, to name a few.

DETERMINING WHETHER FEE RECOVERY IS POSSIBLE

Despite the fact that paralegal fee recovery is not a new concept, many paralegals and attorneys do not know that paralegal fees are a recoverable litigation expense. Next, I shall try to demystify the process.

As you probably know, in California, attorney’s fees and paralegal fee awards are usually only authorized when there is a statutory or contractual (Civ. Code §1717(a)) provision providing for such an award. The first step is to determine whether the matter is subject to the recovery of attorney’s fees either through contract provisions or through a statute. Obviously, if the litigation involves a contract, a review of the contract would reveal whether it contained an attorney’s fees clause. Determining whether a statute permits an attorney’s fees award is a little more daunting, but not impossible.

There are too many attorney’s fee statutes to go into here, but the website, California Attorney’s Fees, has collected a list of many of the California statutes that permit attorney’s fees awards. Here’s a link. The site also links to summaries of case law on a couple dozen categories of legal issues for which California permits attorney’s fees awards. Here’s a link. In addition, because case law has and continues to shape paralegal fee recovery, on its website, CAPA has a put together a nice collection of summaries of California and federal cases involving paralegal fee recovery. Here’s a link.

One you and your supervising attorney have determined that attorney’s and paralegal’s fees are recoverable in your case, you as a paralegal can assist the attorney in preparing a fee petition that also seeks recovery of paralegal fees.

PREPARING THE FEE PETITION

Here is a link to a sample memorandum of points and authorities in support of an attorney’s fees/paralegal fees award petition, as well as sample paralegal and attorney declarations. This example can be used as a guide in preparing any attorney’s fees/paralegal fees recovery motion.

You will note that the memorandum begins by outlining the applicable law that authorizes attorney’s fees in the particular case. This is followed up by explaining the case law on paralegal fee recovery. In a separate document, a paralegal declaration is included.

THE SIX KEYS TO A SUCCESSFUL PARALEGAL FEE RECOVERY PLAN

The paralegal declaration may be the most important part of the fee petition. In preparing the declaration, I have tried to keep in mind six keys to successful paralegal fee recovery. If you pay attention to these keys in preparing your fee petition, your chances of success will be much higher.

Here is a brief discussion of each of the six keys:

  1. Make sure the services performed by the paralegal are legal in nature.
    1. Submit a memorandum outlining the work performed by the paralegal on the case.
    2. The attorney should also submit an affidavit or declaration with the request for paralegal fees attesting to the fact that the work was legally substantive in nature (not clerical) and that the paralegal's work was reasonable and necessary.
    3. Substantive tasks consist of tasks and services which otherwise would be performed by an attorney.
    Here’s an example of why this key is vital: In a Texas bankruptcy court case, In re Speeds Billiards & Games. Inc., Debtor (E.D. Tex. 1993) 149 Bankr. 434, counsel did not indicate what constituted staff time, whether it was paralegal time or secretarial. Thus, the court held that any doubt must be resolved in favor of a finding that such a request constitutes normal attorney overhead which must be absorbed in counsel's hourly rate.

  2. Make sure the performance of the services was supervised by an attorney.
    1. The attorney should adequately supervise the paralegal’s work and should also submit an affidavit or declaration that the paralegal's work was in fact supervised by an attorney. An attorney declaration accompanying the fee petition is quite helpful in this regard. A sample attorney declaration is linked to above.
    2. For example, in McCullough v. City of Oakland (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1, paralegal fees were denied because attorneys had failed to submit any declaration or documentation for the time spent, leaving the court with no choice but to exclude these fees from the award.

  3. Make sure the qualifications of the paralegal were specified in the request for fees in sufficient detail to demonstrate the person is qualified by virtue of education, training or work experience to perform substantive legal work.
    1. Proof of the paralegal’s qualifications to perform legally substantive work should be submitted.
    2. This could include a copy of the paralegal’s resume and paralegal degree or certificate showing his or her education, work experience and other qualifications.
    3. I like to use a paralegal declaration to establish this aspect. There’s a link to a sample paralegal declaration above.

  4. Make sure the nature of the services performed were specified in the request for fees in such a way that the court can determine if the services performed were legal rather than clerical.
    1. This can be accomplished if the paralegal keeps accurate and detailed time records that reflect exact and accurate time increments for specific tasks.
    2. Keep original hand-written time sheets, even if they have been converted to computerized time-tracking programs. Print out hard copies of time records, sign and date them. Retain all time sheets until the case is finished and the time for filing appeal has expired or all appeals are exhausted.

  5. Make sure the amount of time expended by the paralegal is se forth in the request and is reasonable.
    1. The attorney should also submit an affidavit or declaration with the request for paralegal fees attesting to the fact that the paralegal's work was reasonable and necessary.
    2. Make sure the amount charged reflects reasonable community standards (market rate) for charges by that category of personnel.
    3. The market rate refers to the fact that an amount charged should reflect reasonable community standards for charges by that category of personnel.
    4. The courts may look at salaries in the community and the experience level of the person performing the work. You can help the court by submitting paralegal salary surveys for your area.
    5. Submitting the paralegal’s resume and salary surveys helps educate the courts and document your charges.

Paralegal fee recovery does not have to be difficult. As paralegals, we can help educate the attorneys with whom we work on how to comply with the applicable requirements and greatly increase their chances of recovering these fees.

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U.S. Supreme Court Strikes Down California's Determinate Sentencing Law


Published in the Redwood Association of Paralegals Quarterly Newsletter, the REAP Record, Spring 2007

In January 2007, the U.S. Supreme Court held that California’s determinate sentencing law was unconstitutional because it allows judges to increase a defendant’s sentence based on facts that have not been found to be true by a jury (Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. 270.)

California’s sentencing law was challenged by John Cunningham, a former Richmond police officer who was convicted of child molestation in a case involving his son, who was between nine and 10 years-old at the time of the crimes.  The high court held that California’s sentencing scheme violates a defendant’s right to a trial jury trial safeguarded by the Sixth Amendment  because it places “sentence-elevating fact-finding within the judge’s province,” rather than a jury’s. 

I will come back to the specifics of Cunningham later, but to understand the impact of the Cunningham decision, a brief explanation of the history of the state’s determinate sentencing law (DSL) is in order.

In the pre-DSL days, felony offenses were punishable by open-ended periods in state prison.  For example, a person convicted of burglary may have been sentenced to a prison term of five years to life.  State prison inmates sentenced under the old sentencing law had to go before parole boards to determine when they would be released.

California’s DSL took effect in 1977.  Under the DSL sentencing framework, felony offenses were punishable by one of three prison terms.  For example, under the current DSL framework, most first degree robbery convictions are punishable by a state prison sentence of three, four or six years.   Under the DSL, a first degree robber would automatically be sentenced to the middle term of four years in state prison unless the judge found that certain mitigating or aggravating factors were present.  The mitigating and aggravating factors are spelled out in the California Rules of Court.  If the judge found the mitigating factors outweighed aggravating factors, he or she could impose the lower term.  An example of a mitigating factor might be that the defendant was a passive participant or played a minor role in the crime, or that the defendant has no prior criminal record.

However, if the judge found that aggravating factors outweighed mitigating factors, he or she could impose the upper term.  An example of an aggravating factor might be that the victim was particularly vulnerable, or that the defendant has engaged in violent conduct that indicates a serious danger to society.

Now back to the Cunningham case.  The three potential prison sentences faced by Mr. Cunningham for the particular crime he was convicted of were 6, 12, or 16 years in prison.  The judge found that Cunningham's victim (his son) was particularly vulnerable and that his conduct was violent, making him a danger to society. The judge then concluded that this aggravating evidence outweighed any mitigating factors, which included the fact that Cunningham had no criminal record, and imposed the upper term of 16 years. 

According to the Supreme Court, the problem with this is that an aggravating factor does not have to be found to be true by a jury using the proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard.  The judge can find that an aggravating factor exists by using the preponderance of evidence standard.  This violates a defendant’s right to a trial by jury, and is thus unconstitutional.

How will Cunningham affect California’s sentencing system?  Will thousands of defendants who received upper terms have to be resentenced?    In published reports, Los Angeles County District Attorney Steve Cooley said that in his opinion, Cunningham should not affect upper term cases where the defendant entered a guilty plea and waived his right to a jury trial.  The problem with Cooley’s analysis, as I see it, is that even though a defendant may have waived the right to a jury trial, such a waiver does not waive the right to have sentence elevating facts proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 

While appellate lawyers are trying to determine whether and how to appeal cases under the Cunningham ruling, the California Supreme Court has agreed to hear five cases alleging sentencing error under Cunningham.

In the wake of Cunningham, the legislature considered various options for bringing the state’s sentencing law into constitutional compliance, including proposals to amend the DSL to require juries to find true any fact necessary to impose the upper prison term.  Another option considered, Senate Bill 40, would allow judge’s the discretion to select from the three possible prison terms without having to find facts in aggravation or mitigation. 

In the end, the latter proposal prevailed.  On March 30, 2007, Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger signed SB40 into law.  Until it sunsets in 2009, judges will be free to impose any of the three sentences on defendants. 

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Law and Language: It’s All in a Word


Published in the Redwood Association of Paralegals Quarterly Newsletter, the REAP Record, Winter 2007

One reason I went into the paralegal profession was due to my affinity for language and writing.  When I found out that the legal profession places a premium on linguistic precision, I knew this was the career for me. 

One recent newspaper article illustrates this point about how precise language in the law must be.  “Is a Burrito a Sandwich?  Judge Says No,” read the headline in the Houston Chronicle.  The source of this headline derives from the outcome of a lawsuit in Massachusetts. 

Here’s what happened.  It seems that the Panera Bread Co., a chain of bakery and cafes that serves sandwiches and pastries, entered into a lease agreement to rent space for one of its stores in the White City Shopping Center in Shrewsbury, Mass. In an effort to protect its market share, Panera’s lease contained a clause that prohibited the shopping mall from renting space to other sandwich shops.

Enter Qdoba Mexican Grill, a Mexican food franchise along the lines of Chevy’s.  Qdoba wanted to rent space for one of its eateries in the same White City Shopping Ccenter where Panera had already set up shop.  Panera’s lawyers cried foul, claiming that its lease prohibited the shopping center from renting to another sandwich shop, and, that the burritos and other items offered by Qdoba were sandwiches.  Paneras lawyers argued that a flour tortilla is similar to the bread in a sandwich and that both foodstuffs typically are filled with meat; therefore, a burrito is a sandwich.  Qdobas attorneys fired back that a burrito is not a sandwich, and the whole enchilada ended up in court.

In resolving the question of whether a burrito is indeed a sandwich, the judge in the case heard testimony from a chef and a former government agriculture official, both of whom argued that burritos are not the same as sandwiches. 

The judge who heard the case cited Webster’s Dictionary in his decision.  “A sandwich is not commonly understood to include burritos, tacos and quesadillas, which are typically made from a single tortilla and stuffed with a choice filling of meat, rice, and beans,” wrote Superior Court Judge Jeffrey Locke in his decision.

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